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Abstract
Because of its relation to economic growth, there is a policy interest in mea-
suring social capital and average trust as its currently most important proxy.
Thereby a main focus is determining its variation across groups with different
individual characteristics. In this paper we combine the virtue of laboratory ex-
periments and survey data analysis. We present results from a novel experiment
conducted on a representative sample of the Dutch population. The advantages
of this combination of methods are to shed light on four almost undocumented
yet important issues in trust economics. Our results can briefly be summarized
as follows. We do not find evidence of a participation selectivity bias which is
a serious concern for laboratory experiments which rely almost exclusively on
volunteer participants. Contrary to the existing literature, we find that stated
trust measures correlate with experimental trust. The differences in parameter
estimates across both measures are significant, but do not hold a jointly test.
We also find that the age and education profiles of trust are opposite to those of
reciprocal behavior. Finally, we find that the choice of proxy variable for social
capital matters greatly, leading to very different inferences.
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Introduction
It is increasingly argued that a nation’s social capital can influence its economic perfor-
mance. Although there is an ongoing debate over what constitutes social capital (see
e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 2002), it is generally accepted that average trust and trust-
worthiness are two important components. The transactions cost paradigm remains
the traditional way of thinking about the mechanism by which average trust affects
economic performance as higher average societal trust leads to lower transactions costs
which in turn improve both the functioning of organizations and governments which
ultimately leads to better economic performance.
The empirical evidence supporting this approach relies on the influential work of
Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001) and La Porta et al. (1997). All three
papers rely on the World Value Survey (WVS) cross-country trust index. The WVS
constructs this trust index by drawing a random sample in each participating country
and respondents are asked to answer the following question
WVS trust question Generally speaking would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
The WVS reports for each country the percentage of responders who indicated that
”Most people can be trusted”. This index has been used in cross-country growth re-
gressions (Knack and Keefer and Zak and Knack) and to assess the performance of
institutions across countries (La Porta et al.). Because of its strong correlation with
economic growth, it becomes relevant for policymakers to correctly measure average
trust and trustworthiness and to understand how they correlate with individual charac-
teristics such as age, education and income. This can shed light on the evolution of an
important component of social capital as the age and income distributions evolve over
time, two well known challenges facing western economies (Gruber and Wise, 2001).
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Measuring the evolution of average trust in a society requires a micro level analy-
sis. There exist very little empirical and theoric work which can explain how trust and
trustworthiness varies across a population. Allesina and La Ferrara (2002) use data
on a sample of individuals in the United-States who have answered the WVS trust
question under the heading of the General Social Survey (GSS) project. Their em-
pirical results show that recent history of traumatic experiences, belonging to a group
which historically felt discriminated and low levels of income and education have strong
negative influences on trust. One drawback of this study is that it is based on the self-
reported measure of trust, the WVS trust question, which may be misreported by the
individuals. This is particularly important since misreporting of a discrete dependent
variable may lead to severely biased slope parameters even when the model correctly
specifies the true unobserved categorical variable (see Bound et al. 2001 for a survey
on the impact of this type of measurement error). Even though it is intuitively clear
that self-reported answers to the WVS trust question may well be misreported, the
empirical evidence suggesting that this is the case is scarce (see Bellemare and Kro¨ger,
2003 for a first attempt to analyze the importance of misreporting in the WVS trust
question).
Economic experiments, which collect data on revealed rather than stated prefer-
ences, is a potential alternative to survey data. The seminal experiment of Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) (hereafter BDM) initiated an important follow-up lit-
erature and remains today the main experimental design used to assess the presence
of trust and trustworthiness in a population. The BDM game is tailored to capture
trust as defined by Coleman (1990). He defines an interaction as one involving trust
when three contextual elements are present. i) a person S must place confidence in
the action of another person R which could lead S to experience a loss of welfare. ii)
A trustworthy R behaves such that S is better (or at least not worse) off than he was
before placing trust in R, iii) successful use of trust in transactions should make both
S and R better off. The BDM design captures all three components of Coleman’s
definition.
The empirical evidence of BDM is clear: most people trust others as more than half
of the trusters send positive amounts most of them close to half of their experimental
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endowment. Also, trustworthiness as more than half of the trustees show significant
signs of reciprocity, returning almost half of the possible amounts. Numerous studies1
have extended the BDM design to asses the robustness of the findings to different
environmental settings.
There are several reasons why current laboratory experimental methods are inad-
equate to measure average trust in a society. First, social scientists have argued that
trust is learned (Hardin 1996) as it is a function of past experiences. If this is the
case, we can expect that trust behavior will differ across age and education categories.
Because of their ease of recruitment and their low opportunity costs, student subject
pools are generally invited to the laboratory. Unfortunately, university subject pools
are relatively homogeneous and hence lack the required variation in socioeconomic
characteristics to identify the variation of trust and response behavior across groups
with different background characteristics. Some attempts have nevertheless been made
(e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000 and Burks et al., 2003) but have failed to find any system-
atic pattern. It is important to note that this should not be interpreted as evidence
implying that controlling for background characteristics is not informative but rather
it signals a lack of adequate data to perform these measurements. Secondly, an in-
evitable consequence of most laboratory experiments is that they cannot control for
the fact that subjects with specific unobserved characteristics self-select themselves to
participate in the experiment. If these unobservable factors are related to the outcome
that is measured in the lab, a familiar selection bias will be present. Eckel and Gross-
man (2000) is one of the few attempts to investigate this self-selection phenomenon.
Comparing student volunteers to student non-volunteers2 they conclude that volun-
teers perform significantly differently than the non-volunteers. Additionally, the use
of student subjects makes extrapolation of this finding to a more general population
1Glaeser et al. (2000) measure social capital among participants with the BDM game and addi-
tionally by analyzing the willingness to pay in a dropped envelope game. Gneezy, Gu¨th, and Verboven
(2001) investigate whether distributional considerations might explain the trustor’s behavior by vary-
ing the range from which the trustee can send back. Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003) study
whether changing roles in a trust game gives rise to a more cooperative outcome as both parties
experience all situations as trustor and trustee. Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing (2000) find that
the results of BDM are quite robust using different frames. All these papers find that the results of
the BDM experiment are robust and lead to conclude that revealed trust is an important aspect of
economic behavior.
2Those subjects did not deliberately decided to participate in an experiment. They were recruited
in the course where the experiment was conducted immediately during the class.
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difficult.
Both survey data analysis and laboratory experiments approaches have important
limitations. Laboratory experiments analyze behavior of subjects interacting with
other participants in a controlled environment. All decisions have real monetary con-
sequences for each individual. This method has the virtue of measuring revealed trust
intentions of individuals at the expense of generally doing so with homogenous student
subject pools lacking the required variation in background characteristics to measure
the parameters of interest. On the other hand, survey data like the World Value Sur-
vey (WVS) and the General Social Survey (GSS) observe responses in hypothetical
situations from an heterogenous sample of a population at the expense of measuring
stated preferences for trust. In this paper, we measure trust based on revealed as well
as stated behavior in an experiment evaluated for a representative sample of the Dutch
population. The sample allows to address several key issues discussed previously. First,
the variation of the observed characteristics in the sample allows to measure the im-
pact of various background characteristics on the revealed trust propensity. Secondly,
we propose a new minimum distance test statistic based on the distance between the
underlying data generating processes of the stated and the revealed trust responses.
We find significant differences between the stated and revealed data generating pro-
cesses. Thirdly, our experimental procedure allows us to control for self-selection of
participants in experiments. This may be particularly interesting if we believe that
individuals who generally decide to participate in experiments are more likely to have
characteristics which systematically affect their experimental behavior.
The idea of using more heterogeneous subject pools in experimental economics is
not new as testing the assumption of ”parallelism” between the lab and the field has
been a source pre-occupation for some time. The most popular mediums to reach
more diversified participants have been newspaper experiments (e.g. Bosch-Dome`nech
et al., 2002, Gu¨th, Schmidt and Sutter, 2002), and, more recently, the Internet (e.g.
Lucking-Reiley, 1999). These papers generally evaluate the parallelism by comparing
unconditional response distributions. Bosch-Dome`nech et al. find that newspaper and
lab subjects playing the guessing game have remarkably similar unconditional behav-
ioral responses. The above line of studies do not allow to make population inferences,
5
as the subjects are not drawn randomly from the population of interest. Two note-
worthy experiments have recently been run with representative samples. Harrison et
al. investigate the heterogeneity in individual discount rates by having a small yet
random sample of the Danish population come to play a laboratory experiment. They
find that the length of education, the work status (whether unemployed or not), and
retirement seem to explain differences in discount rates across groups. Hey (2002) ran
an experiment on decision making under risk and uncertainty using a large sample of
the CentERpanel of Tilburg University, which manages a random sample of the Dutch
population. He reports no significant effects of background characteristics on subject
responses. Hey’s findings are somewhat related to the newspaper guessing game results
as both experiments tried to investigate financial decision making processes and find
inconclusive effects of background characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we describe the
design for both methods, the experiment and the survey data question, in greater detail
and summarize the experimental procedure. The models describing trust and response
behavior are introduced in section 2. In section 3 we present and discuss the empirical
results for the participation decision, trust propensity, and response behavior. Section
4 concludes.
1 The experimental design and procedure
The recruitment of our subjects was made by CentERdata, the survey research in-
stitute accommodated at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The main activity of
CentERdata is to manage and carry out panel surveys through a telepanel: the Cen-
tERpanel (CP). The CP is a panel of about 2000 representative Dutch households.
The members of thouse households answer questions at home. We first give a brief
description of the CP and then explain in detail our experimental design.
Every week households across the Netherlands are randomly drawn from the CP.
These weekly questionnaires are delivered every Friday and some members of the se-
lected households are asked to answer a questionnaire. They do this at any time
between Friday and Tuesday of the following week, either on their computer or on a
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television set which is connected to a set-up box linking the household to the CentER-
data server. In order to have a random sample of the Dutch population,3 low income
households without a computer or a television set where given the necessary equipment
in order to complete the weekly questionnaire.
There are many reasons why the CP is an attractive device to conduct experiments.
Apart from giving us access to a representative sample our design replicates as closely as
possible the environment of a laboratory experiment as participants answer questions
on a computer or a television set. Sample computer screens4 (in Dutch) in the ap-
pendix of this paper show that they resemble typical laboratory screens. Furthermore,
CP participants are acquainted to payments in fictitious currency as CentERdata re-
imburses the weekly telephone costs for answering the questionnaire in CentERpoints5
which are automatically credited to each respondents private bank account four times
a year. Finally, because participants interact with CentERdata, the experiment is dou-
ble blind as participants were told that they will be matched anonymously and that
their identities would not be given to the experimenters.
In the trust game a sender S sends a share of his endowment to a responder R.
R receives the amount plus interest (the amount is multiplied by a number greater
than one) and has then the possibility to send back an amount to S. The payoffs for
both players are as follows. S receives his initial endowment reduced by the amount
sent plus the amount received from R. R earns additionally to her initial endowment
the multiplied amount sent by S reduced by the amount R returns to S. Since the
trust game described above is an interactive game involving two players and because
panel members respond at different times of the day during the answer period, we
chose to have the responders play the strategy method. The strategy method requires
from responders to state contingent responses for each possible amount they might
receive from their sender. The response which corresponds to the decision of their
sender will be chosen to be the effective action and will determine the payoff of both
3Immigrants are excluded from the panel as their language proficiency in Dutch makes it difficult
for them to answer the questions on a weekly basis. For a description of the recruitment and sampling
methods of CP members see: www.centerdata.nl .
4A translated version of all screens can be found in appendix B. All screenshots of the experiment
in Dutch are available upon request at the authors.
5The exchange rate is 1 CenterPoint = 1 EuroCent ( = 0.01 EURO).
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participants. Apart from allowing us to have senders play with responders at different
times, the strategy method has several advantages. First, it facilitates data acquisition
as the complete strategy plan for all 11 possible amounts received is elicited. Secondly,
as our game may seem complex to some subjects, the strategy method requires that
people thoroughly familiarize themselves with the ramifications of all choices, so that
we do not retrieve data from uninformed choices. Thirdly, reciprocity to trust in
economic transactions might appear to be based on quick responses but seems rather
a tough intensive process. People do not react inconsiderately but take rather time to
think about the consequences of their actions, e.g., concerning self-perception, strategic
and/or moral ventilations, and what they plan to do in each possible contingency they
will face. As we attempt to understand responses to trust, it would seem more natural
to employ the strategy method.6
In our design, a sender S and a receiver R are endowed with 500 CentERpoints. We
discretize the choice set of the senders to 11 amounts 50×yE with yE ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9, 10}.
The amount sent is doubled7 by the experimenters. Responders played the strategy
method which means they had to state how much they are willing to give back to
the sender for each of the 11 possible amounts that senders can send to them. After
all participants made their decisions, senders and responders were randomly matched.
Payments were subsequently made by taking the element of the strategy of each receiver
that corresponds to what their matched sender player had actually sent to them.
Under the assumption that the objective of both players is own payoff maximization,
the Nash equilibrium of the game is for the sender to send nothing to the receiver as
the payoff maximizing receiver’s dominant strategy is to return nothing to the sender.
Hence, observing increasing positive amounts sent is interpreted as evidence that people
increasingly trust others. Likewise, observing positive returned amounts is taken as
evidence of the existence of reciprocity. By being a one shot game, the BDM design
6According to usual beliefs in economics, the stationarity of preferences of individuals across differ-
ent choices implies that the strategy method would yield the same decisions as the procedure involving
observed actions. Nevertheless, it is still believed that some actions might trigger a stronger response
in an immediate ’hot’ environment. The evidences supporting this case are weak. Brandts and Char-
ness (2000) find that the strategy method and the hot environment do not yield significant different
responses in two simple sequential two player games.
7The choice of the multiplier usually varies between 2 (e.g. Glaeser et.al. 2000 and Gneezy et al.
2001) and 3 (BDM and Ortmann et al. 2000 )
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allows to measure a basic trust propensity which abstracts from reputation effects and
punishment strategies which emerge in games of repeated interaction. Disentangling
basic trust from reputation, punishment and experience effects in repeated trust games
is difficult (see Anderhub et al. 1999 and Willinger et al. 2003?). These effects are
deliberately excluded in the present design.
During the experiment participants could switch back and forth between the screens
until completion of the experiment, after which they were not allowed to go back again.
Additionally to their decisions in the interaction, subjects were asked to state their
beliefs about the decision of their allotted partner and for senders additionally the
average decision of panel members who interact in the same role as they do. After the
experiment each participant was asked to state their average experience with trust by
answering the following question
Lifetime trust experience question In the past, when you trusted someone or
something, were you usually rewarded or usually disappointed?
(Always rewarded) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 (Always disappointed).
In addition, we asked each participant to answer the WVS survey trust question men-
tioned in the introduction. This will allow to compare the inferences which can be
made using stated and revealed decisions for the same subjects. The timing of the
WVS trust question raises several methodological issues. As human behavior may
change over time due to certain events or experiences, one would ideally want to col-
lect both measures from the same person at the same point in time. However, it is
important that the first measurement does not influence the other in a matter which
cannot be controlled for.
One possible control strategy consists of running several experiments with different
sequences of the tasks. For our experiment this would mean that some participants
first interact in the experiment followed by answering the questions concerning trust
experience and behavior. Other participants would face the reverse order, first answer-
ing the trust related questions and afterwards decide in the experiment. This design is
undesirable as the terminology within the experiment is deliberately neutrally labelled
to prevent framing effects, e.g., words related to the subject of study like ”trust” are
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not mentioned at all. Asking the trust question beforehand would frame the whole
experiment and the revealed data would be contaminated. This is likely to happen
if participants generate specific anticipations concerning the behavior in the experi-
ment which no longer under the control of the experimenter. Alternatively one ask the
WVS trust question several weeks before the experiment is run. This is precisely what
Glaeser et al.. (2000) have done. In their design, the WVS trust question was asked
2 months before the experiment was undertaken. Their within subject comparison is
valid under the strong assumptions that the trust propensity of subjects is stable over
time and that subjects have in the meantime forgotten their answers and/or do not
condition on it later in the experiment. Gleaser et al. do not make any attempt to ver-
ify if the experimental result is corrupted in any way by having subjects answer first the
WVS question, nor do they check is answers to the WVS are stable over time. One of
the main results of the Gleaser et al. study is that WVS answers do not correlate with
experimental trust. Abstracting from the possible non-stationarity in subjects trust
propensities, we will show in the next section that that the ”no-correlation” result of
Gleaser et al. has in any case no clear behavioral interpretation.
Since our main contribution is to have a random samplke reveal their trust and
reciprocity preferences, we first had subjects play the experiment followed by the WVS
trust question. We test for the presence of contagion effect in the WVS answers using
appropriate econometric techniques which will be discussed in the next section.
Two weeks after their decision participants received de-briefing and feedback in-
formation summarizing the experiment, their decision, the decision of their matched
partner and their final payoff which then was added to their CentER bank accounts.
Despite all the advantages of using the CP, some elements are sources of potential
concern. First, panel members were not constrained to complete the experiment in a
limited amount of time and this could mean that some seek advice to answer their ques-
tionnaire. Explaining the procedure in greater detail in the remainder of this section
we show that answering time for the experiment is rather low making such collusive
behavior unlikely.
The experiment was conducted in two sessions, in the 31st and the 36th weeks of
the calendar year 2002. 541 CP members were randomly contacted to participate in
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the economic experiment. Each individual contacted had to read an opening screen
informing them that they were selected to participate in an experiment conducted
jointly by a team of researchers from Tilburg University and Humboldt University
Berlin. Anonymity was stressed through out the opening screen. A detailed description
of the game followed with the mode of payments. Each person was informed that
conditional on their participation, they would be randomly matched to one of the roles.
The role is only revealed to panel members once they have agreed upon to participate.
Out of the 541 panel members contacted, 42 panel members declined to participate,
leaving us with 499 panel members who completed the experiment of which 276 were
S players and 223 were R players8.
Table 2 gives the variable descriptions and descriptive statistics of the 541 household
members contacted per role category. The means of most variables are relatively iden-
tical across non-participants, senders and responders. 63.7% of the persons contacted
were heads of households and most players either had a secondary or vocational training
degree. Catholics and protestants are the two most important religious communities
in the sample and their relative weights in the three participation categories are very
similar. Two notable differences across the three groups concern work propensity and
age. Non-participants are on average 10 years older than both senders and responders.
This age effect is also reflected in a higher labor market retirement frequency and lower
labor work participation.
Figure 1 gives a graph of a nonparametric regression of the participation decision in
the experiment on age. The participation probability remains close to 1 from the age of
16 to 40. From 40 onwards however, the participation probability significantly declines
and reaches a low of 82% at the age of 60. Beyond 60 years of age, the participation
probability increases again, although this rise is not statistically significant. As most
non-participants did not mention any specific reasons for their decisions, we can offer
some hypothetical explanations for the mid-life drop in participation. First, the natural
explanation would be that non-participants have a higher opportunity costs of time.
8Of the 42 non-participants, 14 of which had initially accepted to play but eventually backed out
of the experiment after having observed the roles they were assigned to play. It is interesting to note
that 11 out of the 14 panel members who declined to participate after having observed their roles
were R players.
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25th Median 75th IQR N
Not Played 0.73 1.28 3.36 2.63 42
S 2.40 3.29 4.30 1.89 276
R 4.10 5.93 8.15 4.05 223
Table 1: Percentiles of the minutes spent playing the experiment. The Inter-Quartile-
Range (IQR) is defined as the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th
percentile of the distribution.
This interpretation is inconsistent with the descriptive evidence indicating that non-
participants are both less involved in the labor market and do not have above average
income. An alternative explanation would be that non-participants are more reluctant
to get involved into cognitive demanding tasks. CentERdata keeps track of the time
taken to answer any question they ask their members to answer. Table 1 displays some
statistics on game completion time for all types of panel members contacted.
As expected, non-participants have the lowest participation time in the experiment
at evey point of the distribution, with a median time slighlty greater than a minute.
The distribution of time of play of R dominates that of S players at every quartile, a
result primarily due to the fact that R players had to play the time-intensive strategy
method. The interquartile range serves as a measure to judge inequality in a distri-
bution. We find that R players not only took more time to play the experiment but
that the distribution of their time of play is the most dispersed, followed by that of
non-participants and that of S players. We mentioned previously that the unlimited
answering time given to the participants allows for the possibility of group rather than
individual decision making. Assuming that collective decision making takes time to
complete, a high game time would be a source of concern. However, since the majority
of players took less than 10 minutes to complete the experiment from the time they
logged in the CentERdata network, it is unlikely that such collusive behavior is present.
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2 The senders decision
2.1 Revealed versus stated trust behavior
We model trust as an unobserved continuous latent process. Let individual i’s unob-
servable trust propensity T ∗i ∈ R be represented by the following linear single index
form
T ∗i = x
t′
i β
t + εti (1)
where xti (K × 1) is a vector of realizations of the observed characteristics of proposer i
plus a constant term, βt (K × 1) is the complete vector of unknown slope population
parameters and βt∗ will be referred to as the vector of slope parameters excluding the
constant term. We observe two different discrete measures of trust for each individual,
the yEi ∈ Y E comes from revealed preferences of the experiment and yWV Si ∈ Y WV S
based on stated preferences based on answers to the WVS trust question. Both sets
are defined as
YE = {0, 1, ..., C}
YWV S = {0, 1}
The categories correspond to the amount sent assuming that the individual trust
propensity increases with higher amounts sent. We are interested in measuring the
effects of background characteristics of trust. Both discrete measures can be thought
of being generated from two distinct mappings from the real line to either YWV S or
YE. The ordered and binary response mapping functions (Maddala, 1983) yield the
following choice probabilities
Pr
(
yEi = j|xti
)
= Pr
(
ηj−1 < T ∗i < ηj|xti
)
for j = 0, 1, ..., C (2)
where {ηj−1}Cj=0 are threshold parameters We make the following normalizations η−1 =
−∞ and ηC =∞. The probabilities of stating that one trusts is given by
Pr
(
yWV Si = 1|xti
)
= Pr
(
T ∗i > η0|xti
)
(3)
In both models, η0 is not separately identified from the constant, we normalize it to
0. Under the assumption that εi is normally distributed with variance σ
2 we obtain
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the familiar ordered and binary probit models. Allesina and La Ferrara (2002) use the
binary probit to analyze individual responses to the WVS trust question. Implicit in
their empirical model is the underlying latent trust propensity defined above. In par-
allel, the ordered probit model has been used to analyze experimental trust responses
in the BDM game. Here again the latent trust propensity is implicit in the empirical
model.
In our design, senders answered the WVS trust question after having chosen yEi .
This contrasts with Glaeser et al. who asked the WVS two months before the exper-
iment took place. As we discussed in the previous section, there are advantages and
disadvantages to both approaches. The main disadvantage of our approach is that
senders have the possibility to reinforce their experimental decisions with their answer
to the WVS question rather than to state their true underlying trust propensity. This
would induce a spurious resemblance between both measures. Two cases are worth
mentioning. First, an individual who sent a large amount in the experiment may be
more inclined to state that he trust others when in fact he would have answered nega-
tive if the experiment had not taken place before hand. We denote the probability of
this event as α10
(
yEi
)
. Secondly, some of the low senders may be more likely to state
that they do not trust others when in fact they would have answered the opposite
had the experiment not preceded the WVS question. Correspondingly, we denote the
probability of this event as α01
(
yEi
)
. If either event occurs with positive probability,
our WVS trust answers are potentially misclassified, where the magnitude and the di-
rection of the misclassification would depend in part on yEi . To investigate this claim,
we generalize the binary probit model (3) to allow for the possibility of misclassifica-
tion. Using the law of total probability, we can rewrite the probability of answering
positively to the WVS trust question as
Pr
(
yWV Si = 1|xti , yEi
)
= Pr
(
yWV Si = 1|T ∗i ≥ 0, yEi
) · Pr (T ∗i > 0|xti) (4)
+Pr
(
yWV Si = 1|T ∗i < 0, yEi
) · Pr (T ∗i < 0|xti)
=
[
1− α01
(
yEi
)] · Pr (T ∗i > 0|xti)+ α10 (yEi ) · Pr (T ∗i < 0|xti)(5)
Equation (5) shows that in the presence of misreporting, the probability that a sender
states that he trusts others will be a weighted sum of the probability that he would
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really answer positively and that he would really answer negatively to the WVS ques-
tion. In the absence of misclassification Pr
(
yWV Si = 1|xti , yEi
)
= Pr (T ∗i > 0|xti ), which
corresponds to truthful statement of preferences. It is important to note that the ex-
perimental decision yEi only affects answers to the WVS trust question via their effect
on the misreporting probabilities. Put another way, the experiment does not directly
affect the trust propensity of an individual but it affects his probability of misreport-
ing his true intentions. We make the following functional form assumptions on the
misclassification probabilities
α10
(
yEi
)
=
exp
(
θ100 + θ
10
1 y
E
i
)
exp (θ100 + θ
10
1 y
E
i ) + 1
α01
(
yEi
)
=
exp
(
θ010 + θ
01
1 y
E
i
)
exp (θ010 + θ
01
1 y
E
i ) + 1
All models are estimated my Maximum Likelihood. Some special cases are of interest.
If θ101 = θ
01
1 = 0 misclassification is random in the population of senders
9 and is not
affected by the preceding experiment. This hypothesis can be tested using usual Wald
type tests (e.g. Ruud, 2000). When (α10 = α01 = 0), senders truthfully answer the
WVS question. We test for this last hypothesis using the log-likelihood ratio test
approach of Andrews (2001)10.
2.2 Comparing stated versus revealed preferences
A heavily debated topic is whether stated trust measures convey any information of
the true underlying trust propensity of individuals. Glaeser et al. (2000) run a linear
regression of yEi on y
WV S
i and a set of covariates and find that the coefficient of y
WV S
i
is not statistically significant. They interpret this result as evidence that stated trust
measures are unreliable as the result of individual misreporting of their true trust
intentions. This result has since been referred to as convincing evidence against the
use of stated trust responses (Bowles and Gintes, 2002) . We now show that the
Glaeser et al. test explores whether or not the unobserved component determining
9This is the model studied by Hausman et al. (1998).
10The parameter space of the misclassification probabilities is [0,1]×[0,1]. Under the null hypothesis
of no misclassification, α10 = α01 = 0 rests on the boundary of the parameter space. In this specific
case, it is known that the distribution of the LR test statistic is no longer a standard chi-square
distribution. Andrews (2001) proposed a technique to simulate the true critical values of the LR test.
For a recent application of this method, the reader is referred to Dustmann and van Soest (2003).
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yWV Si correlates with y
E
i . The proof of this result starts by writing down the following
two linear probability models
yEi = x
t′
i β
E + λyWV Si + ε
E
i (6)
yWV Si = x
t′
i β
WV S + εWV Si (7)
The first equation corresponds to the linear probability model estimated by Glaeser
et al. where the experimental results are regressed on the observed characteristics and
answers to the WVS trust question while the second equation relates answers to the
WVS trust question to the same vector of observed characteristics. Substituting (7) in
(6)
yEi = x
t′
i β
E + λ
(
xt′i β
WV S + εWV Si
)
+ εEi
= xt′i
(
βE + λβWV S
)
+ λεWV Si + ε
E
i
= xt′i β
E+ + λεWV Si + ε
E
i (8)
where βE+ = βE + λβWV S. Equation (8) clearly shows that testing λ = 0 amounts to
testing whether εWV Si correlates with experimental trust. Economically, it is unclear
whether this correlation is of any interest. The literature comparing stated and revealed
preference data has long recognized that the unobserved components of both types of
data are likely to differ. Hence, the insignificant result found by Glaeser et al. can be
difficultly interpreted. At a more fundamental level, it is more interesting to examine
whether the inferences made on the joint effects of background characteristics on trust
differ between both measures. This would require a test which compares the systematic
part of the trust propensity across both models. The powerful feature of our empirical
approach is to recognize that both experimental and WVS trust responses are modelled
as being generated from the same underlying linear trust propensity (1). If all statistical
assumptions of the model hold, Maximum Likelihood yields consistent estimates of
βt/σ =
{
β1
σ
, β2
σ
, β3
σ
, ..., βK
σ
}
. As we just discussed, comparing βt/σ across both models
is undesirable as σ2 in both models are related to unobservable components whose
difference have no clear behavioral interpretation. However, dividing βt/σ by say the
second component β2
σ
yields a vector βt/β2 =
{
β1
β2
, 1, β3
β2
, ..., βK
β2
}
which is independent
of σ. This suggests fixing the k’th slope parameter to 1 or -1 and recovering consistent
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estimates of ξ = βt−/βk (where βt− is the subset of βt which excludes the k’th slope
parameter) both with the ordered and binary probit models.
Under the null hypothesis that the effects of background characteristics are the
same, both sets of estimates would equal each other11. This forms the basis of a new
minimum distance test which simply evaluates whether there are sufficient statistical
differences between both sets of estimates. Our test statistic has the following familiar
quadratic form
N
(
ξE−ξWV S)′W−1 (ξE−ξWV S) ∼ χ2 (K − 2)
where ξE and ξWV S denote the vector of parameters of the experimental and stated
trust models andW represents the covariance matrix of the difference vector ξE−ξWV S.
A proof of the consistency, asymptotic distribution and details on the computation of
the test can be found in the appendix of the paper.
2.3 The reciprocity decision
Responders were asked to play the strategy method by which they state how much they
will give back for each of the 11 possible amounts they can receive from the sender.
This design implies that we observe for each responder an eleven dimensional vector
yR
yr =

yr0 ∈ [0, 500]
yr50 ∈ [0, 500 + 2× 50]
yr100 ∈ [0, 500 + 2× 100]
...
yr500 ∈ [0, 500 + 2× 500]
where yr0 denotes the amount the responder is willing to return when receiving 0 Cen-
tERpoints from the sender, and so on. For any given individual, an increase in yra as a
increases may be due to the fact that the responder can return more and not because of
the presence of genuine reciprocity. Since reciprocity is of primary interest, we remove
this effect by dividing yra by the upper bound of the width of category a, expressing
11The constant term parameter is generally not separately identified from the threshold parameters
in both the binary and ordered probit models. Given their values are function of the ad hoc threshold
assumptions, they are not used in computation of the test.
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the amounts returned as percentages of the total possible amount sent for each cat-
egory. Note, that this transformation only normalizes all responses to lay between 0
and 1. We model increase reciprocity as the increase in proportion of possible money
returned as a increases. Let Ria ∈ [0, 1] for all a = 0, 1, 2, ..., 10. Rescaling censors the
data below at 0 and above at 1. We take this into account by first defining the ”true”
underlying reciprocity propensity index
R∗ia = x
r′
i β
r+λ (a) + εri (9)
where xri (K × 1) is a vector of background characteristics of the receiver including
the receiver’s age, income, level of education and his beliefs about the sender’s action.
The associated vector of unknown population parameters is βr (K × 1). Since all
observed characteristics xri are invariant across all a, any fixed effect type of estimation
procedure would prevent us from estimating βr, our focus parameters. We must then
assume that any individual specific effect constant across all alternatives is captured by
the covariates xri . The parameter λ (a) is an a-sender specific constant term, allowing
for shifts in levels between categories. Monotone reciprocity would imply the chain
of estimates λ̂ (0) ≤ λ̂ (1) ≤ ... ≤ λ̂ (10). One could estimate the shift parameters
by adding 10 fixed effects to the model. In the empirical application, we opt for a
more parsimonious specification of the threshold model whereby λ (a) = γ1a + γ2a
2
which reduces the amount of parameters to estimate from 10 to 2 (γ1, γ2).
12 Given the
continuous nature of the density of the unobservable latent variable and the observed
mixture of discrete and continuous observations, the observation rule is given by
Ria = max {0,xr′i βr+λ (a) + εri} (10)
In this paper, we consider two ways to recover estimates of βr and [γ1, γ2]. If ε
r
i is
homoscedastic and normally distributed, consistent estimates of Ξ = {βr, γ1, γ2, σ2}
can be obtained by maximizing the Tobit (1958) likelihood function. Discussion of the
properties of this estimator can be found in Maddala (1983). However, the Tobit model
is generally quite sensitive to the specification of the error distribution (Goldberger,
12We have estimated both the extended and parsimonious parametrization of the shift parameters
and found that both sets of results revealed the same monotonic paths. Results of the extended
parametrization are available from the authors upon request.
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1983, Arabmazar and Schmidt, 1982), likelihood-based estimators are in general in-
consistent when the assumed parametric form of the likelihood function is incorrect.
Furthermore, heteroscedasticity of the error term can also cause inconsistency of the
parameter estimates even when the shape of the error density is correctly specified, as
Hurd (1979) as shown. Our second estimator of (10) is the Symmetrically Trimmed
Least Squares estimator (STLS) of Powell (1986). Contrary to Tobit, the STLS es-
timator does not require normality and is robust to (bounded) heteroscedasticity of
unknown form in εri , hence it is semiparametric. Moreover, it does not require that
moments of εri but simply that ε
r
i is symmetrically distributed. Under the null hypoth-
esis of normality and homoscedasticity of the error term, both the Tobit and STLS
estimators consistently estimate the conditional mean of the latent process R∗ia al-
though STLS will be relatively inefficient. Under the alternative that the error term
is non-normal (but symmetric) and heteroscedastic, Tobit is inconsistent while STLS
remains a consistent estimator of the model parameters. This will allow us to test
the Tobit specification against non-normality and heteroscedasticity using a Hausman
(1978) specification type test.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Trust
Figure 4 shows the distribution of revealed experimental responses for senders. The
two distinctive features of this distribution are 1) the majority of subjects send positive
amounts, contradicting self-interested behavior, 2) the distribution is heavily skewed
to the left, with a mode at 5, the equal split category. The distributions of laboratory
trust responses usually share both these characteristics, which implies at first glance
that unconditional trust responses of our random sample of the Dutch population do
not differ much from the unconditional distribution from samples drawn from student
populations.
53% of our senders answered that most people can be trusted to the WVS trust
question. To investigate whether senders who gave progressively more also tended to
answer more positively to the WVS trust question, we ploted in each figure 4 the share
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of positive responses to the WVS trust question for each of the 11 categories sent. For
individuals who have sent 0 or 1 unit, more than three quarters of them have reported
negatively to the WVS trust question. This share progressively decreases from 2 units
sent to 4 units sent. In category 5, i.e., sending half of the own endowment, senders
are divided in their answers to the WVS trust question. This may be explained by
being indifferent between giving a little or nothing and a lot or everything. In this
case this category represents neutral actions as giving more is interpreted as signaling
generosity while giving less is interpreted as making an unfair offer. This form of
indecision could also explain the reported mix in answers. Finally, we find that 67%
of those individuals who sent amounts above this indifference point have answered
positively to the WVS trust question. These results combines indicate that there
seems to exist an unconditional relationship between stated and experimental trust.
We now turn to the regression results which are presented in table 3. Due to little
observations we join categories 6 to 9 and estimate an ordered probit model with eight
categories (0=0 CP sent, 1=50 CP sent, 2=100 CP sent, 3=150 CP sent, 4=200 CP
sent, 5=250 CP sent, 6=300, 350, 400, 450 CP sent, 7=500 CP sent). The table presents
results from the ordered and binary probit models, each with three specifications. We
include a vector of standard background characteristics such as age, income, education
and religion in all six specifications.
The first 3 columns of the table are the ordered probit estimates of the experimen-
tal response yEi . The first specification includes senders’ expected amount returned by
their responders (STHINK) and senders’ estimate of the average amount that others
will send (SMEANS) and the senders answer to the WVS trust question. The sec-
ond specification omits the answer to the WVS trust question while specification 3
omits WVS and senders’ beliefs. The last two columns are the probit regressions of
the WVS answers. Specification 4 contains the standard background characteristics
and specification 5 is the probit model with misclassification due to the experimental
response.
In analyzing our results, we will frequently compare them with results found in
Allesina and La Ferrara (2002), Glaeser et al. (2002), Putnam (2000) and La Porta et
al. (1997). It is important to note that both studies rely on organization membership
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of subjects as a proxy for social capital. In fact, Glaeser et al. motivate their approach
precisely by referring to the Glaeser et al. (2000) finding that WVS trust answers were
flawed as they do not correlate with experimental trust. Both experimental trust and
organizational membership are likely to capture different concepts. Nevertheless, as
trust and organizational membership are both believed to be important components
of social capital, a comparison of our results to these studies will shed light on the
robustness of the findings to the choice of proxy for social capital.
Before comparing results using experimental and survey trust measures, we test
whether having senders answer the WVS trust question after having played would of
affected their trust behavior. Specification 5 presents regression results where senders
are allowed to misreport their true answer to the WVS trust question and the size and
magnitude of the misclassification. Both θ101 and θ
01
1 associated with senders experi-
mental decision yEi are not significantly different from zero which indicate that senders
experimental decision did not lead them to systematically misreport their true answer
to the WVS trust question. There could still be random misclassification. The log-
likelihood ratio test of Andrews (2001) based on specifications 4 and 5 has a value of
5.38 with 10% simulated critical value of 7.02, again not rejecting the null hypothesis
of no-misclassification. These results seem to show that senders’ survey trust answers
were not systematically affected by the experiment which preceded. Moreover, they
also seem to show the absence of any form of misclassification, be it random or related
to the preceding experiment.
Gender, individuals retired from the labor force or not working and all do not
correlate with either experimental or WVS trust responses. This contrasts with the
earlier findings of Glaeser et al. (2002) who find that women are less involved in
organizations while income has a positive effect on organizational membership.
The age effect captured is robust and of similar magnitude across both the or-
dered and binary probit specifications. Both age parameters are significant and of the
expected sign reconfirming the concave life-cycle pattern usually found in the social
capital literature (Putnam 2000, Glaeser et al. 2002).
The education profile differs remarkably between the experimental and the stated
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trust responses. Individuals with secondary and technical training are more likely to
exhibit laboratory trust than subjects with either low education levels (the omitted
category) and subjects with high levels of education. These findings tend towards an
inverted U shape similar to that of age. Comparisons of specification 1 with speci-
fication 2 and 3 show that this relationship is robust. On the other hand, however,
this education profile is not at all present in the survey trust probit estimates. It is
important to note that Glaeser et al. (2002) also find that organizational membership
increases with education but does not find presence of non-linearities.
The impact of religion on trust remains a controversial issue in economics. La
Porta et al. (1997) find that country specific religion indicators negatively affect trust
in a panel of countries. They rationalize this finding in terms of social norms and
hierarchies that these religions impose. On the other hand, Allesina and La Ferrara
(2002) find that the religion does not explain micro level answers to the WVS trust
question. One reason for this apparent conflict is aggregation. Our regression results
show that the effect of religion on trust is very much driven by the measure used. In the
case of experimental data, we find no evidence of any systematic religious differences;
this result holds across the different specifications. However, religious effects come out
very significant in the WVS probit regressions. We find that catholics and protestants
are less likely to report trusting others than individuals reporting to have other not
having any religious beliefs.13 This finding is in line with those reported by La Porta
et al. (1997).
Participants in the role of senders were asked to state their beliefs about the response
they expect to receive (STHINK) and their evaluations of what they think the average
sender will send (SMEANS). Both variables have positive effects on trust and are
highly significant. Apart from being statistically significant, these two variables alone
improve the predictive fit of the model substantially, with a log-likelihood ratio statistic
of 232.12 and a 5% critical value of 5.99 for a test of the null of no joint significance.
These results would imply that senders who expected to receive more also sent more
and those who thought other persons in the same role were going to send more to the
responder increased the own amount sent. The latter result can be interpreted as a
13Other religious beliefs account with 11% rather less for this categogy.
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social norm while the former result captures expectations of the subjects.
The effect of senders lifetime experience with trust (TRUSTEXP) (see section 1
above) was recorded on a seven point scale. Somewhat like religion, reported experience
with trust does not predict well subjects experimental trust responses but correlated
remarkably well with the WVS trust answers, with a positive and significant effect.
Finally, we discuss the robustness of the Glaeser et al. (2000) finding that answers
to the WVS trust questions do not correlate with experimental trust. The first two
columns of table 3 show the regression results where the dummy variable WVS is added
as a regressor. We find this variable to be significant at the 5% level using both Wald
and LR test procedures. On one hand, this result is not that surprising as we have
seen in figure 4 that there was some form of parallelism between both measures, as
those who have sent less in the experiment were relatively more likely to have answered
negatively to the WVS. The notable differences between the Glaeser et al. study and the
present one are that we asked the WVS-question after the experiment whereas Glaeser
et al. weeks before. As we showed above, senders experimental decisions do not seem to
have affected their truthful revelation of their survey trust answers. More importantly,
we showed in section 2.2 that this correlation is difficult to interpret, as it implies that
the unobservable factors explaining survey trust correlate with experimental trust, a
correlation on which not much can be said.
The preceeding analysis has compared parameter estimates based on two different
trust measures. We have found that the effect of religion and education may provide
different information depending on the trust measure used. However, the similar age
profiles and the similar insignificance of some other covariates imply that both trust
measures may, for some covariates, provide the same information. In section 2.2, we
introduced a new minimum distance test which tests for joint discrepancies between
both measures. For our data, the test has a value of 6.78, with a 5% chi-square critical
value of 22.36, clearly not rejecting the null hypothesis that the systematic part of the
latent trust propensity is the same using both measures. This test result implies that
the discrepancies between education and religion effects are not sufficient to overturn
the similar age profiles and insignificant effects. This insignificance result could cause
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the possible low power of the test to detect some alternatives in a small sample. This
issue is still a matter of investigation.
Before turning to the analysis of the responders choices, we briefly summarize the
main points of this section. We made an effort to compare our findings to the existing
social capital literature. This was primarily done to investigate robustness of the results
to the proxy measure of social capital used. Our results show that experimental trust
and organizational membership are likely to measure different behavioral characteristics
of subjects. Nevertheless, as trust and organizational membership are both believed
to be important components of social capital, our results suggest that estimation of
gender, income and life cycle profiles will strongly be affected by which measure of
social capital used. This section also showed that contrary to Glaeser et al. (2000), the
WVS trust answers seemed to be correlated rather well with our experimental measure
of trust. Finally, we found that the presence of religion and education effects depend
on whether or not we use experimental (revealed) or WVS (stated) trust measures but
that those differences do not holt a jointly. Furthermore, subjects’ beliefs are important
determinants of their trust actions while lifetime trust experience is not.
3.2 Reciprocity
Figure 5 shows a boxplot of the average amounts returned for every possible unit the
sender can choose to send. The two important elements of this figure are that amounts
returned increase with the amounts sent and that the variability in the amounts re-
turned increases with the amount sent. Figure 6 shows a boxplot of the normalized
returns, i.e., the percentage returned out of the total possible amount of R sent back to
S. The general pattern remains the same, as this percentage monotonically increases
with the amounts received.
We now turn to the econometric results of the responders model. Table 4 shows
the regression results of the Tobit and the STLS estimators for two specifications of
the reciprocity propensity. In the first specification, reciprocity is modelled as a func-
tion of several background characteristics of the responder and their beliefs (RTHINK)
about senders’ possible actions. The second specification allows for the possibility that
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subjects’ beliefs RTHINK, stated trust WVS and reported trust experience TRUST-
EXP may vary with the age of the responders by including interaction terms. Both
specifications were estimated using the parametric Tobit model and the semiparamet-
ric STLS model. In both cases, the Hausman test statistic does not reject the null
hypothesis of normality and homoscedasticity of the error terms14 on which the To-
bit model rests. To compare the specification with and without interaction terms, we
computed a standard log-likelihood ratio test. The test value of 19.9 and a 1% critical
value of 11.34 clearly rejects the parsimonious specification in favor of the specification
with interaction terms. Given the relative efficiency of Tobit over STLS under the null
hypothesis and our specification tests, our analysis will focus on the results from the
Tobit model.
The parameters of γ1 and γ2 correspond to the vector of units sent to the receiver
and its square. They are indicative of the path of the shift parameters λ (a). As could
be seen from the raw data in figure 5, the estimates show that λ (a) are increasing and
progressively diminishing over a, a clear indication of monotonically concave reciprocity
as responders give systematically more for each unit received. This is also reflected in
the Tobit estimates. We find that the mean conditional reciprocity is increasing and
concave in the amounts received.
The life cycle evolution of reciprocity is captured by the parameters of RETIRED,
AGE, AGESQ and the three interaction terms. The change in the conditional mean
return propensity which follows from a change in age is given by
∂R∗ia
∂AGEi
= −0.0014
(0.0014)
+ 0.000032
(0.000017)
AGEi − 0.0014
(0.0005)
WVSi − 0.0003
(0.0000)
RTHINKi (11)
This indicates that participants tend to reciprocate less as they get older but at a
decreasing rate. Additionally, those who report trusting others and who believe that
they will receive more tend to return on average less as they get older. It is important to
note, that this result only reports the average response. In a quantile regression analysis
of the response behavior, Bellemare and Kro¨ger (2003b) (Bellemare and Kro¨ger 2003b)
14For the two specification presented in table 4, the Hausman test statistic is respectively 3.107 and
with bootstrap 5% critical values of 39.43 and based on 250 replications.
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show that individuals returning the most increase their share returned as they get
older.
These results differ remarkably from the life cycle patterns observed in the trust
responses where trust was shown to be strictly decreasing and concave with age. The
education pattern also seems to reflect an opposite picture than for trust. We find that
educated subjects tended to return significantly less than non-educated subjects with
no significant differences between secondary, training or university level education.
Contrary to the trust results documented earlier were gender did not appear to play
an important role, we find that men return on average significantly less than women.
There are nevertheless some areas where trust and reciprocity have concomitant effects.
We do not find any relationship between income, work status, retirement status and
lifetime trust experience to correlate with reciprocity. Similarly to experimental trust
results, religion effects seem to be absent. RTHINK measures the beliefs of responders
what they expect their matched sender will eventually send to them. We find that
those responders who believed they would receive more increased the proportion they
are willing to return. Finally, we find that those who reported trusting more others
were also more likely to return more to the senders. This fact supports the findings in
Glaeser et al. (2000) were the same relationship was shown to exist.
The main conclusions of this section are the following. First, age and education
profiles of reciprocity were shown to be at odds with those of the trust propensity. We
find that higher educated subjects trust more but return less and that trust decreases
with age while reciprocity does exactly the opposite. Second, we have found that men
tend to reciprocate significantly less than women. Despite these differences, there are
nonetheless similarities between both trust and reciprocity behavior. First, life time
experience with trust, religion, income and work and retirement status do not correlate
with reciprocity while subjects’ beliefs are shown to be significant determinants of
reciprocity. Furthermore, stated trust answers to the WVS question correlate with
trustworthiness. This confirms previous findings in this literature.
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3.3 Participation
Once contacted by CentERdata concerning our experiment panel members could decide
whether or not to participate. The reasons for participating in laboratory experiments,
especially the impact of financial rewards, have been analyzed in serveral meta studies
(Smith and Walker, 1993?, Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001, Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
But also the impact of voluntary participation (Eckel and Grossmann, 2000) has been
of interest for investigation. There has always been a fear that experimental subject
pools are non-random samples of the population of interest. Amongst the most cited
explanations of this non-randomness are that participants might be motivated intrin-
sically (Camerer and Hogarth), e.g., have above average taste for gambling and risk or
higher cognitive abilities . The crucial question is whether or not non-randomness of
participants based on these traits feeds itself into non-randomness in the experimental
outcomes.15
Usually investigation of participation bias is limited by two data-shortcomings.
First, some of the traits affecting participation are mostly unobservable to the ex-
perimenter, often because they are difficultly measurable. Secondly, experimenters
generally do not have any information on non-participants, preventing any possible
control for their effects without further combinations of additional information and as-
sumptions (see Manski, 1999). Because of these data limitations, tests of participation
bias in laboratory-type experiments are scarce.
CentERdata uses a common method and selects CP members after certain criteria
to ensure the representativeness of the Dutch population of the CP. The approached
households are asked to participate in the panel (see section 1). Camerer and Hogarth
mention that beside monetary incentives also intrinsic motivations play an important
role to guide the attraction to participate in laboratory experiments, which is certainly
the case for other scientific investigations like survey investigations. The incentives
15The statistical dependance between the experimental outcome and the participation decision
implies that Pr (Y |x, d = 1) 6= Pr (Y |x) where Y is the random outcome of an experiment and x are
some conditioning characteristics. This inequality says that the probability distribution of observed
outcomes of participants will differ from that of randomly assigned participants to the experiment,
given x. This result holds generally for the Ordered Probit model with the experimental measure(
Y = yEi ,x = x
t
i
)
, the Binary Probit on the survey trust measure
(
Y = yWV Si ,x = x
t
i
)
and the Tobit
model of the responders decision (Y = Ria,x = xri ).
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for Dutch persons to participate in the CP are not monetary. They receive a reim-
bursement for their telephone allowances while connected to CentERdata to answer the
questionnaires. In this light, we probably face an already intrinsically highly motivated
sample and thereby we might exhibit even a larger particiaption rates when asking to
join and interact in an experiment with financial rewards than one would expect in the
real field. Nevertheless, 7% of the panel members approached decided not to partici-
pate. In our experiment, non-participants are observable CP members with observable
background characteristics. This allows us to test whether or not participants behaved
in a non-random manner.
We test for participation bias in the framework developed by Heckman (1978)16. Let
di ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator of participation in the experiment and let the an individuals
unobserved latent propensity to participate.
d∗i = x
j
iδ + θRATIOi + ε
d
i for j = r, t
where xji is the conditioning vector entering the trust and reciprocity models, ε
d
i is
an unobservable N (0, 1) component driving participation and (δ,θ) are unknown pop-
ulation constants. A general feature of these models is the requirement of a valid
exclusion restriction for nonparametric identification of the selection bias. In practical
terms, we need a variable which affects participation but not directly the experimen-
tal and survey responses. We computed the variable RATIO, which is the number
of questionnaires completed to the total number of questionnaires submitted to a CP
member in the three months which preceded our experiment. The dependance between
the experimental outcomes and the participation decisions is captured by the amount
of correlation between εdi and the unobservable components ε
t
i in trust propensity (for
t = E and WV S, see equation (1)) and εri in the reciprocity propensity (see equation
(9)). For the trust responses, we estimated separately both the ordered probit and bi-
nary probit models jointly with the selection equation. We estimated the Tobit model
with selection for the reciprocity decisions.
The presence of participation bias can be determined by testing the statistical
significance of all three correlation coefficients. In all three cases we did not find any
16Heckman (1990) gives an overview of more recent developments in selection models
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correlation coefficients to be significantly different from zero, which implies the absence
of selection bias in our data. Most of parameters entering the systematic part of the
participation propensity were insignificant. One notable exception was income which
came out with a positive and significant effect on participation. Absent the income
effect, we conclude that participation in our experiment seems to be mostly driven by
unobserved heterogeneity which does not correlate with the experimental decisions.
4 Conclusions
The interest in trust is fascinating as it is confusing. At the micro level, two comple-
mentary methodologies have been used. On one hand, survey methods collect answers
for heterogeneous samples, at the expense of having to rely of hypothetical and stated
measures. On the other hand, laboratory experiments offer the possibility to collect
data on actions deemed to reveal subjects preferences at the expense of collecting this
data for a very special subset of the population of interest. This paper presented results
from one of the first computerized trust experiments conducted on a random sample
of the Dutch population which tries to combine the strengths of laboratory and survey
data collection methods without their weaknesses.
Our design allows us to make four important contributions. First, we address the
issue of the behavioral representativeness of student subject pools in trust experiments.
The distinguishing characteristics of university students are their relatively high level
of education and their young age. We find an inverted-U shape relationship between
trust and education, where university graduates and uneducated subjects trust signif-
icantly less than subjects with a average level of education. Surprisingly, we find that
reciprocity has a U shape relationship with education. This mirror result also holds for
the age profiles. The age profile of trust has the inverted-U shape commonly found in
the literature which uses stated trust and other social capital measures. Nevertheless,
we find the age profile of reciprocity to be convex with age. To our knowledge, these
are the first life-cycle and education profiles results on reciprocity to trust. One addi-
tional finding which is of interest concerns the absence of any religious effect on both
experimental trust and reciprocity.
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The second contribution of the paper is to contrast the inferences made when using
stated or revealed trust measures with an heterogeneous sample. We find that educa-
tion effects are present when the experimental trust measure is used while insignificant
using answers to the WVS trust question. A general result of the current paper is that
religion does not correlate with experimental trust nor within reciprocity. A surprising
result is that religion strongly explains stated WVS trust answers. To paint a complete
picture of the different inferences which can be made using either trust measures, We
proposed a new test statistic aimed at comparing the systematic part of each model.
Even though there are clear differences between the significance of individual parame-
ters across both survey measures, the differences do not hold jointly. Finally, contrary
to Glaeser et al. (2000), we find that answers to survey trust questions correlate well
with experimental measures of trust, controlling for several observable characteristics.
We show that this correlation may be of dubious interest, since it amounts to test-
ing whether the unobserved component determining WVS type trust answers correlate
with experimental trust.
Thirdly, we show that inferences on the effects of subjects’ background character-
istics on social capital strongly depends on the measure of social capital used. We
showed that previous studies using organizational membership as a proxy for social
capital find different age and gender patterns. An explanation of this fact is that
trust and organizational membership are two distinct yet important contributors to
social capital. Because of their distinctiveness, inferences on the effect of background
characteristics are likely to differ depending on the social capital proxy used.
Finally, we have been able to analyze subject participation in an experiment and,
more importantly, test whether or not participants in an experiment behave system-
atically different than randomly selected subjects. Our results show that participation
bias is not present in the data. This contrasts to some existing results and common
beliefs which emphasized that risk-seeking gamblers and high cognitive individuals
compose the bulk of participants subject pools.
The results presented in this paper leave several questions unanswered. First, much
more needs to be done to reconcile the age and education patterns which distinguish
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trust and reciprocity propensities. Secondly, the representativeness of student subject
pools for other types of experiments is still open for question. Whether or not the
effect of subject background characteristics presented in this paper can be generalized
to other experimental settings remains a topic of future research.
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A Minimum Distance Test
We present here a minimum distance test for observable characteristics. Let
U→ denote
uniform convergence and
d→ convergence in distribution. Further, EN denotes expec-
tation taken with respect to the empirical distribution and E expectation take with
respect to the population distribution. We have an unknown population parameter
vector θ0 and let θ̂1 and θ̂2 be two
√
N−consistent estimators of θ0 that satisfy
θ̂1 = argmax
θ
EN
[
L1 (θ)
]
θ̂2 = argmax
θ
EN
[
L2 (θ)
]
where L1θ (θ) and L
2
θ (θ) are the scores of the concentrated log-likelihood functions of
the probit and ordered probit models and L1θθ′ (θ) and L
2
θθ′ (θ) their associated matrices
of second derivatives. Then, if follows that
√
N
(
θ̂1 − θ0
)
= −{EN [L1θθ′ (θ)]}−1√NEN [L1θ (θ0)]+ op (1)
√
N
(
θ̂2 − θ0
)
= −{EN [L2θθ′ (θ)]}−1√NEN [L2θ (θ0)]+ op (1)
where θ = αkθ̂1 + (1− αk) θ0.
√
N
(
θ̂1 − θ0
θ̂2 − θ0
)
= −
{( {
EN
[
L1θθ′
(
θ
)]}−1
0
0
{
EN
[
L1θθ′
(
θ
)]}−1
)
√
N
(
EN [L
1
θ (θ0)]
EN [L
2
θ (θ0)]
)}
+ op (1) (12)
Under appropriate regularity conditions (see Newey and McFadden (1994)),
EN
[
L1θθ′
(
θ
)] U→ E [L1θθ′ (θ0)] ≡ H1
EN
[
L2θθ′
(
θ
)] U→ E [L2θθ′ (θ0)] ≡ H2
E
[
L1θ (θ0)
]
= 0
E
[
L2θ (θ0)
]
= 0
which implies that (12) converges in distribution to
N
((
0
0
)
;
(
H−11 0
0 H−12
)
E
(
∂
∂θ
L1 (θ0)
∂
∂θ′L1 (θ0)
∂
∂θ
L1 (θ0)
∂
∂θ′L2 (θ0)
∂
∂θ
L2 (θ0)
∂
∂θ′L1 (θ0)
∂
∂θ
L2 (θ0)
∂
∂θ′L2 (θ0)
)(
H−11 0
0 H−12
))
= N
((
0
0
)
;
(
V11 V12
V21 V22
))
It follows that √
N
(
θ̂1 − θ̂2
)
d→ N (0;V11 +V22 −V12 −V21)
When estimator 2 is relatively efficient compared to estimator 1, V12 = V21 = V22 by
the orthogonality projection lemma (see Ruud 2000 ). In the present case, none of the
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estimators is relatively efficient. Hence, we need to compute consistent estimates ofV11,
V22 and V12. Consistent estimators of these elements follow by replacing population
expectations with sample analogues and θ0 by either θ̂1 or θ̂2, both equivalent under
H0. The Generalized Hausman test is given by
GHT = N
(
θ̂1 − θ̂2
)′
[V11 +V22 −V12 −V21]−1
(
θ̂1 − θ̂2
)
(13)
The limiting distribution of GHT is χ2 (K). In practice, all four unknown components
of the covariance matrix can be replaced by consistent sample estimates V̂ij and the
test statistic is computed as
GHT = N
(
θ̂1 − θ̂2
)′ [
V̂11 + V̂22 − V̂12 − V̂21
]−1 (
θ̂1 − θ̂2
)
.
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B Instructions
Panel members viewed the following screens on their home TV or Computer. Figures 1
and 2 present sample screens which show the decisions screens the senders and respon-
ders faced. In the following we present a translated text of the original Dutch screens.
All original screens are available at the authors upon request. Participants could go
forwards and backwards between screens during the experiment.
The first 3 screens of the experiment are the same for both, sender and responder.
Italic notes in the translation are comments by the authors.
• First screen:
This experiment is a research project of researchers from Humboldt University
Berlin and Katholic University of Brabant.17
With this experiment you can make real money in terms of CentERpoints.18 You
receive from the researchers additional CentERpoints (beside the usual telephone
allowance).
• Second screen:
During this experiment you will be matched with another member of the panel.
You will not know who this person is, both of you will stay anonymous. Both of
you receive 500 CentERpoints. Then the experiments starts.
One of you has the possibility to send a share of this away. The amount of points
sent will be doubled and given to the other person. The other person has then the
opportunity to send a share of the own total amount back. The amount which
is sent back will not be doubled.
How many points you finally earn depends therefore on your decision and the
decision of the person you are matched with. You will be randomly assigned
your role.
• Third screen:
We now give you the chance to indicate whether you want to participate. If
you decide not to participate, the experiment will end immediately. You will
receive the usual telephone reimbursement. If you continue you will receive the
500 CentERpoints.
Dou you want to continue?
© Yes
© No
Subjects who chose to participate were then randomly assigned to their roles. Senders
and receivers had to read decision screens tailored to their role.
Sender:
17Now: Tilburg University. The Katholic University of Brabant changed its name after the experi-
ment.
18Members of the CentERpanel answer the questionnaires on the TV with help of a set-top-box
which is via the telephone connected with the CentERdata. Participating members receive an al-
lowance to cover their telephone costs. This allowance is paid in CentERpoints where 1 CentERpoint
= 1 EuroCent ( = 0.01 EURO).
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• Fourth screen :
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this person
received 500 CentERpoints. You can send a share of your 500 CentERpoints. The
panel member with whom you are matched with receives the doubled amount of
what you sent. Then, this person has the opportunity to send a share of the
own total amount back (without knowing who you are). The amount which this
person sends back to you will not be doubled.
How many points do you want to give?
[The sender could send one out of 11 possible amounts. For the original screen
see figure (1).]
0 the other person receives additionally nothing and has therefore 500 and you
remain with 500 points.
...
500 the other person receives additionally 1000 and has therefore 1500 in total
and you remain with 0 points.
• Fifth screen: (depending on the decision taken at the fourth screen, here as ex-
ample 200)
You decided to send 200 points.
The panel member you are matched with receives therefore 400 additional Cen-
tERpoints.
He or she has therefore in total 900 CentERpoints.
You remain with 300 CentERpoints.
How many points do you think the other panel member with whom you are
matched with will send to you?
[Participants had to type in a number. In this example in the range of [0,900].]
• Sixth screen:
This experiment is done with some panel members. Half of them interact in the
same position as you. They can send a share from their 500 CentERpoints which
is doubled and received by a person of the other position.
What do you think, how many points those panel members have sent?
[The sender could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500.]
Responder:
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. This person received
as you 500 CentERpoints. This person is asked to send you a share from their
own 500 CentERpoints. You will receive the doubled amount of those points the
other person has sent.
For exapmle if the other person has sent 100 CentERpoints you receive 200
CentERpoints. Together with the 500 points you have in total 700 CentERpoints.
From this amount you can return a share. The amount you send will not be
doubled.
• Fifth screen:
As we do not know now how many CentERpoints the other panel member with
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whom you are matched with has sent we present all possible amounts this person
could send to you. Besides this amount it is written what you would receive.
Please indicate in the last column what amount you would return for each pos-
sible amount sent.
After the real decision of the other person is known the amount you indicated
for this particular decision will be realized. The amount you will return will be
deducted from your total amount.
[The responder had to indicate for each of the 11 possibile amounts the sender
could send what he would return. For the original screen see figure (2). The table
was designed as follows:]
If the other sends: I receive: In total with the 500 CentERpoints: In this case I return:
0 0 500
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
500 1000 1500
• Sixth screen:
How many points do you think the panel member with whom you are matched
with has sent to you?
[The responder could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500.]
After these screens the experiment was over. Nobody could go backwards and both
senders and responders were asked the following post-experimental questions:
• Seventh screen (Trust experience question):
The last two questions are about trust in general. This question is about your
own trust experience.
If you trust is your trust generally rewarded or exploited?
Choose the number which is closest to your answer.
always rewarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always exploited.
[Participants had to type in a number between 1 and 7.]
• Eight screen (WVS trust question):
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
After having answered the post-experimental questions, participants were informed
that they would receive the information about the decision the person they were
matched with and the final results in two weeks. All potential participants had the
possibility to express themselves in a comment box after the experiment or after the
decision not to participate.
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U bent anoniem gekoppeld aan een ander panellid. Deze persoon krijgt net als u 500 CentERpunten.
U kunt een gedeelte van uw 500 CentERpunten weggeven. Het panellid aan wie u gekoppeld bent
ontvangt twee maal zoveel als u weggeeft. Daarna krijgt deze persoon de mogelijkheid om een
gedeelte van zijn of haar punten terug te geven (zonder te weten wie u bent). Het aantal punten dat
deze persoon terug geeft, wordt niet verdubbeld. 
Hoeveel punten wilt u weggeven? 
    0   de ander krijgt dan  niets extra en houdt dus   500   u houdt 500 punten over
  50   de ander krijgt dan   100 extra, dus in totaal   600   u houdt 450 punten over
100   de ander krijgt dan   200 extra, dus in totaal   700   u houdt 400 punten over
150   de ander krijgt dan   300 extra, dus in totaal   800   u houdt 350 punten over
200   de ander krijgt dan   400 extra, dus in totaal   900   u houdt 300 punten over
250   de ander krijgt dan   500 extra, dus in totaal 1000   u houdt 250 punten over
300   de ander krijgt dan   600 extra, dus in totaal 1100   u houdt 200 punten over
350   de ander krijgt dan   700 extra, dus in totaal 1200   u houdt 150 punten over
400   de ander krijgt dan   800 extra, dus in totaal 1300   u houdt 100 punten over
450   de ander krijgt dan   900 extra, dus in totaal 1400   u houdt   50 punten over
500   de ander krijgt dan 1000 extra, dus in totaal 1500   u houdt     0 punten over
 
Kies "Verder" om verder te gaan of "Vorige" om terug te gaan.
 Verder Vorige
Centerdata 
Figure 1: Computer screen shot of the decision screens faced by the senders.
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Omdat we nu nog niet weten hoeveel CentERpunten het panellid aan wie u gekoppeld bent weg geeft,
leggen we u de 11 mogelijkheden voor die deze persoon had. Per regel staat steeds wat u kunt
verdienen. Wilt u in de achterste kolom aangeven hoeveel u voor elke mogelijkheid terug zou geven? 
Wanneer bekend is of en hoeveel punten de ander weggegeven heeft, wordt het dubbele bedrag bij
uw 500 CentERpunten opgeteld. Het bedrag dat u daarnaast invult om terug te geven, wordt van uw
saldo afgetrokken. 
als de ander dit geeft: dan ontvang ik:
samen met 500 punten
is dit totaal:
Ik zou dan zoveel geven:
0 0 500 
50 100 600 
100 200 700 
150 300 800 
200 400 900 
250 500 1000 
300 600 1100 
350 700 1200 
400 800 1300 
450 900 1400 
500 1000 1500 
 
Kies "Verder" om verder te gaan of "Vorige" om terug te gaan.
 Verder Vorige
Centerdata 
Figure 2: Computer screen shot of the decision screens faced by the responders.
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Figure 3: Nadaraya-Watson gaussian kernel regression of the participation decision on
age. 95% uniform confidence bands are plotted. Bandwidth is chose by cross-validation
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Figure 4: Distribution of experimental trust as a function of stated responses for
senders.
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Figure 5: Responder’s distribution of gross amounts returned for each units received,
strategy method.
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Figure 6: Responder’s distribution of relative amounts returned for each units received,
strategy method
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